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This paper ¯nds that the market betas of value and small stocks have decreased by
about 75% in the second half of the twentieth century. The path of beta can be closely
tracked using variables that summarize the state of the economy. On the basis of this
analysis, the decline in beta can be related to a long-term improvement in economic
conditions that made these companies less risky. Decomposing beta into the cash°ow
and expected return news components con¯rms that the payo®s of these companies
are less sensitive to market conditions. This ¯nding has implications for the debate
on the CAPM anomalies. The failure to account for time-series variation of beta in
unconditional CAPM regressions can explain as much as 30% of the value premium.
In some samples, about 80% of the value premium can be explained by assuming that
investors tied their expectations of the riskiness of these stocks to the high values of
beta prevailing in the early years.
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11 Introduction
Since the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965), beta risk has become an important input into many asset-pricing applica-
tions. The market beta of a portfolio plays a central role not only in the academic tests of the
CAPM, but also in mutual fund performance evaluation, portfolio optimization and cost of
capital estimation. Beta is also of independent interest, as it summarizes some of the relevant
characteristics of the ¯rm's fundamentals. The analysis of the direction and the causes of
the change in a ¯rm's beta is informative on the relationship between the company's payo®s
and general business conditions, as well as on the correct asset-pricing model. Consequently,
understanding whether and how the market beta changed for some portfolios is informative
on the reasons behind the failure of CAMP in pricing those portfolios For all of these reasons,
this paper takes a close look at the evolution of beta for book-to-market (B/M) and size
portfolios, speci¯cally those stocks that create major problems for the CAPM (e.g., Fama
and French, 1992 and 1993).
Using monthly data from 1926 to 2000, I ¯nd a striking decrease in the market beta
of value and small stocks. Beta fell by about 75% in sixty years for both these portfolios.
In the case of value stocks beta dropped from 2.20 in the early forties to 0.55 in the late
nineties. Similarly, small stocks' beta dropped from 2.50 to 0.65. This decline does not
seem to follow mechanically from portfolio formation procedures, nor does it depend on a
reduction in the leverage of these companies. Also, the magnitude of this decline is by no
means solely imputable to the behavior of these portfolios in the late nineties. Moreover, the
decrease in beta can be explained by a decline in the volatility of these portfolios relative to
the rest of the market, rather than by a drop in their correlation with the market.
The paper also attempts to explain this evolution of beta. The conditional CAPM
literature provides one way to go about this task. Following Shanken (1990), I assume
a linear relation between beta and some state variables, and estimate the parameters of this
function in a conditional CAPM time-series regression. The resulting ¯tted beta series tracks
very closely the original estimated series, and it captures as much as 71% of its variance inthe case of value stocks. The variables that I use as instruments (the T-bill rate, the dividend
yield, the default spread, the term spread, and the growth rate of industrial production) are
tightly linked to general economic conditions (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1989). The general
result is that when the state variables predict an improvement in the economy, these stocks'
betas become smaller. This result not only applies to the cyclical movements of beta, but also
to the long run decrease, because some of these variables display a trending behavior that is
believed to be related to a long-term improvement in business conditions. This evidence is
consistent with the ¯ndings in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), who show that the returns of
value stocks are more highly correlated with fundamental factors when times are bad.
The evidence suggests that the decline in beta has to be tied to the e®ect of better
economic conditions on the structure of value and small companies' cash°ows. Since these
companies are presumably more prone to ¯nancial distress (Chan and Chen, 1991, Fama and
French, 1995), a general reduction in the likelihood of distress can have made their payo®s
less risky. To investigate this explanation, I consider whether the decrease in the beta can
be imputed to a decrease in these ¯rms' cash°ow sensitivity to the market. After breaking
excess returns into components related to news about future dividends, news about future
excess returns, and news about future real interest rates, following Campbell and Mei (1993),
I express the overall market beta as the sum of the betas of each of these components with
the market. Using this approach within a rolling regression framework, I can determine the
importance of each component in the observed decrease of the overall beta. The conclusion of
this analysis is that the decline occurs because of a fall in the dividend news beta. Overall, the
results from the beta decomposition are consistent with the interpretation of the conditional
CAPM analysis, because they point in the direction of reduced cash°ow riskiness.
The decrease in the beta of value and small stocks is interesting by itself, as it sheds light
on the behavior of portfolios widely used in empirical studies and in the asset management
industry. However, the fact acquires even more relevance if it can be related to the debate on
the CAPM anomalies. This paper establishes a connection between the decrease in the beta
of these portfolios and the emergence of a premium in their expected return in two ways.
2The ¯rst way is suggested by the evidence that conditioning information tracks the vari-
ation in beta. Failing to consider the variability of betas causes the constant in the uncon-
ditional CAPM time-series regressions to capture some of the e®ect of the state variables
on the beta. Since the portfolios for which the decrease in beta is bigger (value and small
stocks) are the ones that load more heavily on the state variables, these portfolios are more
likely to have a high premium. It turns out that for value stocks as much as 30% of the
alpha in the time-series regressions can be explained by the time-varying beta.
A connection can also be drawn with the behavioral explanation of the CAPM anomalies.
Daniel and Titman (1997), for example, argue that characteristics, rather than risk, are
priced in equilibrium. They suspect that investors consider these stocks more risky than
they actually are. I argue that the large drop that occurred in the betas of value and small
stocks could have been the reason why investors made mistakes in the assessment of risk. The
market could have incorrectly tied its expectation of the price for risk to the high levels of
beta, which characterized these stocks until the early sixties, even after beta had experienced
a major decrease. Support for this conjecture comes from the result that about 80% of the
value premium in the second part of the sample (1963-2000) can be explained assuming a
beta such as the one estimated in the ¯rst part of the sample (1926-1962).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents in detail the decrease in the es-
timated beta of value and small stocks, and tests the robustness of the fact to mechanical
explanations. Section 3 explains the path of beta using conditional information, as in a condi-
tional CAPM analysis. Section 4 implements Campbell and Mei's (1993) beta decomposition
in order to identify the sources of the change in beta. Section 5 relates the decrease in the
beta to the mispricing of value and small stock portfolios. Section 6 draws the conclusions
of this work.
32 The decrease in the beta of value and small stocks
2.1 The data
The data come from the merger of three di®erent sources. Monthly return data are taken
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, which covers NYSE,
Amex and Nasdaq stocks between January 1926 and December 2000. Accounting data come
from two sources. The Compustat annual research ¯le contains the relevant information for
most publicly traded US stocks. This information is supplemented by Moody's book equity
information manually collected by Davis, Fama, and French (2000) 1. Their paper contains
a precise de¯nition of the book-value-of-equity variable.
Portfolios are formed according to the procedure described in Fama and French (1993).
At the end of June of year t stocks are sorted on either B/M or size. B/M is measured
as the ratio of book value of equity at the end of year t ¡ 1 to market value of equity in
December of year t ¡ 1. Size is market capitalization, i.e. price times shares outstanding, at
the end of June of year t. All stocks are assigned to ten deciles for each characteristic using
the break-points of the distribution of NYSE stocks. For each decile a portfolio return is
computed between July of year t and June of year t + 1 as the value-weighted return of the
stocks in the decile. The excess returns (returns minus the one-month Treasury Bill rate)
on these ten B/M and ten size portfolios are the main variables of interest in this paper.
From now on, unless otherwise speci¯ed, when I refer to 'value stocks' I mean the tenth B/M
decile, and by 'small stocks' I mean the ¯rst size decile.
Panel A of Table ?? provides some summary statistics for the portfolios. Notice the
similarities between the small and value stocks portfolios in terms of means and standard
deviations of returns, and the high negative correlation between the B/M and size decile
assignments, especially in the ¯rst part of the sample. These two categories of stocks be-
come more homogenous to the rest of the market in terms of mean and standard deviation
1I thank Ken French for providing me with the accounting data. The portfolio returns can be downloaded
directly from his web-site.
4of returns in the second part of the sample, when also the correlation between the decile
assignment decreases in absolute value. This last fact is consistent with the results in Fama
and French (2001), who show that a large part of newly listed ¯rms tend to be small ¯rms
with the glamour characteristic.
2.2 The evolution of beta
The ¯rst graphical impression of the decrease in the estimated beta of value and small stocks
can be obtained from Figures 1 and 2. The ¯gures plot the series of estimates of beta for
these two portfolios. The estimates come from rolling regressions, with ¯ve-year estimation
windows and one-month increments. The sample goes from July 1926 to December 2000.
The tenth B/M decile portfolio (Figure 1) displays drastic changes in beta that can be as
high as 2.2 between July 1938 and June 1943, and as low as 0.55 between December 1995
and November 2000. Similarly, the beta of the ¯rst size decile portfolio (Figure 2) peaks at
2.5 between September 1939 and August 1944, and it touches the minimum at 0.65 between
April 1991 and March 1996. For both portfolios, betas display an increase at the beginning
of the sample, peaking in the early forties. Then the series experience a large decline until
the beginning of the sixties, when for both portfolios beta drops below one, this decrease
being more pronounced in the case of small stocks. In the sixties the two series rebound
above one, being more or less stable through the beginning of the eighties, when they start
dropping again. From the mid-eighties through all the nineties the betas stay below one. In
spite of the short-term swings, the long-term picture that emerges is the decreasing trend
that caused value and small stocks' estimated beta to decrease by 75% in about sixty years.
The magnitude of the standard errors of the betas is such that we can statistically rule
out the equality of the estimates from di®erent subsamples. For example, the 2.2 estimate
of beta for value stocks in the 7/38-6/43 subsample has a standard error of 0.17, while the
standard error for the 0.55 estimate from the 12/95-11/00 interval is 0.07. In the middle of
the sample, namely in the ¯rst half of the sixties, when beta lingers around 1.2, the standard
error is about 0.10. More generally, one can check if beta takes on statistically di®erent
5values over time by performing tests of structural change. The results of these tests for
the tenth B/M and ¯rst size decile portfolios (not reported) reject the equality of the betas
over any subsample in which the total 1926-2000 sample can be split. Even in the shorter
1963-1991 sample, which is the one used by Fama and French (1993), the tests reject the
equality of the betas between subsamples for many possible splits. The beta in the second
subsample is signi¯cantly smaller than the one in the ¯rst subsample.
In order to compare the time behavior of the beta for the di®erent B/M and size deciles,
I regress (the log of) each beta series on a time trend. The results are reported in Table 1.
The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West estimator of variance which corrects for the
autocorrelation due to the use of overlapping windows in estimating beta. In the entire 1926-
2000 sample, the trend for B/M portfolios (Panel A) is negative for deciles four through ten,
and it decreases uniformly from the ¯rst to the tenth decile. The fact that beta increases
for the lower deciles is the mirror image of the increase for the highest deciles, and it is
consistent with the theoretical constraint that the value-weighted sum of the betas is one.
The estimated trend in the beta of the tenth B/M decile portfolio is -0.1% per month (1.1%
annually). In the case of size portfolios (Panel B) the trends are negative for all the deciles
but the last one. The trend in the small stock portfolio is -0.08% per month (-0.9% annually).
One might wonder if the responsibility of the negative trend lies with the big drop that
the betas experienced in the ¯fties. In fact, the trend in the beta estimates for the high
B/M and low size deciles is still there, even when I let the estimation sample start in July
1963, which is the beginning of Fama and French's (1993) sample. From Table 1 one can see
that trend coe±cients for value and small stocks are actually larger in absolute value in the
shorter samples. The trend in beta for the ¯rst size decile portfolio in the 1963-2000 sample
is twice as much as in the overall sample.
Given the large correlation between the small and value characteristics reported in Ta-
ble ??, the question could rise whether the decrease in the betas is a small stock phenomenon.
A ¯rst reply to this question can be the fact that the negative trend is actually larger for
the tenth B/M decile portfolio than for the ¯rst size portfolio. The relevance of the value
6characteristic also appears from a double sort of stocks by size and B/M. Companies are
assigned to ¯ve quintiles for each characteristic, and then twenty-¯ve portfolios are formed
from the intersection of the two sorts, like in Fama and French (1993). I perform the rolling
regressions analysis on these twenty-¯ve portfolios and obtain the series of beta estimates.
The estimated trend (not reported) in the portfolio of big high B/M stocks (¯fth size quintile
and ¯fth B/M quintile) is still -0.1% per month (t-stat. = -6.54). Moreover, these stocks
are on average bigger than the companies in other portfolios that are in lower B/M deciles,
and for which the trend is positive. For example, the average size of the companies in this
portfolio is over twenty times that of the stocks in the intersection of the second size and
¯rst B/M quintiles, for which the trend in the beta is instead 0.03% (t-stat. = 2.26). This
evidence con¯rms that the value characteristic is relevant independently of size. I can infer
that also the size characteristic matters by itself from the fact that the beta of the portfolio
of small glamour stocks (¯rst size and ¯rst B/M quintiles) has a signi¯cantly negative trend
(-0.04%, t-stat. = -2.69)/footnoteI consider the e®ect on the observed trend in the market
sensitivity of small and value stocks of the introduction of Fama and French's (1993) HML
and SMB factors. As one might expect, the coe±cient on the market factor is no longer
decreasing over time for value and small stocks. In fact, this coe±cient captures returns
sensitivity to the component of the market that is orthogonal to HML and SMB, and these
portfolios mimic the behavior of value and small stocks. Therefore, the trending behavior in
the beta that is peculiar of these two categories of stocks is ¯ltered out by the inclusion of
HML and SMB..
2.3 A di®erent perspective
A di®erent way to look at the decline in beta is asking whether it is imputable to a decrease
in the correlation of these portfolios with the rest of the market, or to a drop in their relative
volatility. This analysis generates some additional evidence that any explanation of the
decrease in beta will have to account for.
We can consider the market index as composed of two portfolios. Portfolio 1 is either
7the value or small stock portfolio, and portfolio 2 is the rest of the market.
Rm = w1R1 + w2R2; (1)
where w1 + w2 = 1.
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The changes in beta are governed by the changes in its two components r and ½. We can












The size of both the value and small stock portfolios relative to the rest of the market is
so small 3 that the condition for
@¯1
@½ > 0 is always respected.





where ½1;m is the correlation coe±cient between R1 and the market return, ¾1 is the standard deviation
of R1, and ¾m is the standard deviation of the market return. This decomposition yields the same results
as the one in the text. In particular, ¾1
¾m and ½1;m track closely ¾1
¾2 and ½, respectively. The advantage of
the decomposition in the text is that portfolio 2 does not contain stocks from portfolio 1, which makes the
interpretation of the results unambiguous.
3The share of the tenth B/M decile portfolio is on average 2% of total market capitalization, and that of
the ¯rst size decile is on average 1%.
8Equation 1 implies that
w1¯1 + w2¯2 = 1
Therefore ¯1 and ¯2 mechanically move in opposite directions, if weights are constant.
Figure 3 graphs the estimated beta for the tenth B/M decile portfolio along with its two
components: the ratio of the volatility of high B/M stocks (10th decile) to the volatility of
the rest of the market (1st to 9th deciles), and the correlation coe±cient between these two
portfolios. The volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the portfolio monthly
excess returns over a ¯ve-year rolling window. Similarly, the correlation is the correlation
coe±cient between the returns of the two portfolios over ¯ve-year rolling windows.
It appears clearly from the ¯gure that the driving force behind the movements in the
betas is the ratio of the volatilities. This impression is con¯rmed by regressing (the log of)
the ratio on a time trend. The coe±cient is 0.08% per month, very close to the 0.1% of the
betas in Table 1, while the estimated correlation decreases only by 0.01% per month, and
this trend is largely driven by the drop in the nineties. From Figure 3 one can notice that
the estimated volatility of value stocks was 2.6 times that of the rest of the market between
August 1938 and July 1943, and it dropped to 0.7 times in the period between December
1995 and November 2000. A similar picture (not reported) describes small stocks' beta and
its components.
One might be concerned that the change in the weights of the portfolios might a®ect the
comparability of the series in Figure 3 with the decomposition in Equation (2). In fact, I
obtain a similar plot when I use portfolios constructed to have constant weights throughout
the sample.
To complete the picture one needs to describe the evolution of idiosyncratic risk for these
portfolios. For both value and small stocks, idiosyncratic risk, computed as the estimated
standard deviation of the residuals from rolling window CAPM regressions, follows broadly
the path of market volatility, which is documented in Schwert (1989) and Campbell et al.
(2001). Hence, idiosyncratic risk peaks in the years of the Great Depression and World War
II, but then it drops drastically, without displaying any trending behavior. However, unlike
9market volatility, the idiosyncratic volatility of these portfolios is high in the ¯rst half of the
nineties. The absence of a trend in portfolio idiosyncratic risk is not inconsistent with the
¯nding in Campbell et al. (2001) that individual stocks have become more volatile. In fact
their paper also ¯nds that portfolio idiosyncratic volatility (in their case at industry level)
is not trending.
From a market model, where portfolio return is broken into market risk and idiosyncratic










m is the variance of the market return, and ¾2
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portfolio 1. Since beta can be expressed as the product of the correlation coe±cient between
portfolio 1 and the market return (½1;m) times the ratio of portfolio 1 standard deviation to


















¾2, is decreasing much more strongly than ½1;m, which in turn tracks
closely ½, it has to follow that idiosyncratic risk as a fraction of market volatility has de-
creased. The data con¯rm this prediction, and the evolution of the ratio of idiosyncratic
volatility to market volatility follows closely the ratio of total portfolio volatility to the
volatility of the rest of the market that is plotted in Figure 3 (thick solid line).
2.4 Robustness checks
The decrease in the estimated market beta of value and small stocks might be the artifact
of portfolio formation procedures or, more generally, it can be a mechanical result with little
economic content. In order to investigate this possibility I perform a number of robustness
checks.
The share of value and small stocks' capitalization over total market size has changed
over time. This could have caused the decrease in these portfolios' betas, by mechanically
10reducing their weight in the market. I construct a portfolio that includes the highest B/M
stocks up to a certain share of market capitalization, which I keep constant over the entire
sample. I try with a market share of 2%, which is the average market share of the tenth decile
portfolios, and with other values as well (1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%). In all of these cases the
beta of the resulting portfolio, estimated with the rolling regression methodology described
above, displays a comparable decrease to the one for the original value portfolio. Similarly,
I rank the stocks by size, and construct a portfolio of small stocks that has a constant share
of market capitalization. For di®erent market shares (0.1%, 1%, and 5%), the beta of this
small stock portfolio is still decreasing.
Another change that occurred in the portfolio composition is the strong increase in the
number of stocks included in the portfolios. There were 42 companies in the value portfolio
in July 1926 (52 in the small stocks portfolio), while this number was 480 in December 2000
(the number is 2502 in the case of small stocks) 4. The increased number of included stocks
might have a®ected the portfolio beta if it was combined with some change in the shape of
the cross-sectional distribution of betas. Hence, I form portfolios of high B/M and small
stocks that have a constant number of stocks throughout the sample period. These portfolios
continue to display a decline in their estimated betas, for all the number of stocks at which
the composition is held ¯xed.
A related fact is the inclusion in the data set of Nasdaq stocks in 1973. This event was
relevant especially for the small stock portfolio, since Nasdaq stocks were in general smaller
than NYSE stocks. This inclusion could have a®ected the portfolio beta because the market
index is heavily tilted towards NYSE stocks. However, when Nasdaq stocks are excluded
from the portfolios, the trend in both the small stocks' beta and the value stocks' beta is
una®ected.
Another objection that could be raised against the relevance of the fact under examina-
tion, is that the industry composition of the value and small stocks portfolios might have
4The reason why there are so many stocks in the lower size deciles is that size portfolios are formed using
NYSE capitalization break-points, and many Nasdaq stocks are small compared to NYSE stocks.
11changed over time in such a way that these portfolios are now composed of ¯rms belong-
ing to industries that bear less market risk. The ¯rst control that I perform is a within
industry analysis. I construct the value and small stock portfolios using only stocks in one
industry, and restrict the attention to industries that presumably did not experience major
technological changes, so that I control for industry e®ects. For all the industries I consider
(food, consumer products, clothing and oil), the betas of value and small stocks signi¯cantly
decrease over time. An alternative control for industry e®ects consists of replacing the re-
turn of each stock in the portfolios with the return of the industry portfolio to which the
stock belongs 5. If the trend in beta is due to the B/M or size characteristics, as opposed to
industry e®ects, we should expect that the beta of these new portfolios does not trend down.
Consistent with this expectation, the resulting portfolios do not display the same decrease
as the original value and small stock portfolios. In the case of value stocks, for example, the
estimated trend in the portfolio constructed with industry returns is -0.03%, compared to
the -0.10% of the original value portfolio. I interpret the fact that there is still some decrease
in the betas of the new portfolios as due to the correlation between industries and the B/M
characteristic.
The decrease in the market beta of value and small stocks could be the result of a decline
in the leverage of these companies. Lower leverage should lead to a smaller beta. To assess
whether this phenomenon is driving beta, Figure 4 plots the leverage series, de¯ned as book
value of debt over market value of equity, for the value stock portfolio and for the rest of
the market 6. The ¯gure shows that, if anything, there was an increase in the leverage of
value companies over time, so that leverage is not driving the decrease in beta. As leverage
in the overall market is increasing, one might be concerned with the evolution of leverage
for the portfolios of interest relative to the rest of the market. In fact, not even the ratio
of value companies' leverage to the leverage of the rest of the market displays a decreasing
5I used the 17 industry portfolio classi¯cation that can be found on Ken French's web site.
6The accounting data come from the Compustat annual dataset and they start in 1950. Debt is de¯ned as
the sum of book value of current liabilities, long-term debt, convertible debt and preferred stocks. Portfolio
leverage is computed as value weighted average of company leverage.
12trend. Similar results rule out a leverage e®ect for small companies.
Other possible explanations of the observed decrease in the betas are linked to changes
in the informational °ows in the market. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) note that the positive
autocorrelation of stock indices is mainly determined by cross-autocorrelations. In particular,
large stocks tend to lead small stocks, possibly because of non-synchronous trading. As noted
by Scholes and Williams (1977), if a stock is infrequently or non-synchronously traded, the
standard estimate of beta is not representative of its true sensitivity to the market. Hence, it
is possible that changes in the pattern of non-synchronous trading for small and value stocks
determined the decrease in their beta. In order to control for this possibility, I compute
a corrected version of the sensitivity to the market as the sum of the beta on the lagged
monthly return and the standard beta (as suggested by Scholes and Williams, 1977). This
correction does not a®ect the size of the estimated negative trend in the value and small
stock portfolios' market sensitivity.
More generally, every explanation that relates to changes in the informational structure
in the market should have di®erent implications at di®erent frequencies of the data. In
low frequency data information has had more time to reveal itself than in higher frequency
data. Hence, if the decrease in the beta is related to some informational story, it should
be less pronounced at lower frequencies. Using quarterly and annual overlapping data, and
extending the estimation window to ten years in order to have enough data points, does not
seem to give di®erent results from the ones obtained with monthly data. For values stocks,
with all three data types the estimated beta drops from about two to below one. Similarly,
for small stocks the beta drops as much with annual and quarterly data as with monthly
data.
In summary, the drop in beta does not seem to depend on mechanical explanations
relating to portfolio formation procedure, nor does it depend on changes in leverage over
time. Moreover, changes in the patterns of non-synchronous trading do not seem to be
relevant.
The next section, which relates the decrease in beta to macroeconomic conditions, is,
13I believe, the most convincing reply to most doubts that still linger about the economic
relevance of the decline in beta of value and small stocks.
3 Relating beta to macroeconomic conditions
3.1 Time-varying betas and conditioning information
Several studies have produced evidence of time-varying betas for single stocks and for portfo-
lios (e.g., Ferson and Harvey, 1991, Ferson and Korajczyk, 1995, Braun, Nelson, and Sunier,
1995). Shanken (1990) models the time variation of conditional betas as a linear function
of predetermined state variables. Later studies apply this approach to testing multi-factor
pricing models (Ferson and Korajczyk, 1995, Ferson and Harvey, 1999, Lewellen, 1999), and
mutual fund performance evaluation (Ferson and Schadt, 1996).
In the context of this paper, modeling conditional betas as a function of state variables
can help identify the macroeconomic factors, if any, that are driving the decrease in the beta
of value and small stocks.
The rationale to believe that some economic state variables are related to the decrease
in betas is that the value and small characteristics supposedly denote companies that are in
a condition of relative distress 7. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that changing macroe-
conomic conditions a®ect the severity of this condition of distress, and consequently the
riskiness of these stocks's payo®s, as summarized by their market beta.
Suppose the following conditional one-factor model describes the excess portfolio return
Ri;t+1
Ri;t+1 = ®i + ¯i;tRm;t+1 + "i;t+1; (5)
where Rm;t+1 is the market excess return, and Et("t+1) = Et("t+1Rm;t+1) = 0, which implies
that the unconditional expectations of the same expressions are also zero.
7Chan and Chen (1991) show that small ¯rms are more likely to have higher leverage, lower Returns-On-
Equity, and have cut dividends in the recent past.
14Following Shanken (1990), portfolio's betas are assumed to be a linear function of a vector
of k state variables zt
¯i;t = b0;i + b
0
1;izt + ´i;t: (6)
While not imposing any constraint on the process of the market factor, the assumption
that conditional betas depend linearly on some lagged variables allows the second moments
of the conditional distribution of portfolio and market returns to change over time in a simple
way. The variables used to predict conditional betas are public information, and summarize
the state of the macroeconomy.
Using Equation (6) to replace for ¯i;t+1, Equation (5) can be rewritten as
Ri;t+1 = ®i + b0;iRm;t+1 + (b
0
1;izt)Rm;t+1 + ´i;tRm;t+1 + "i;t+1: (7)
Providing that ´i;t is regressively independent of all the information at time t, the sum
´i;tRm;t+1 + "i;t+1 can be considered as an orthogonal error term ut+1, and the regression in
Equation (7) yields consistent estimates.
The estimates of b0 and b1 from the time-series regression in Equation (7) allow us to
obtain a ¯tted value for ¯i;t
b ¯i;t = b b0;i +b b
0
1;izt; (8)
which gives the benchmark series to which compare the observed decrease in the estimated
betas of value and small stocks.
3.2 Empirical implementation
The state variables that I use in the analysis are the ones that in previous studies proved to
be good predictors for expected returns and betas. They are: (1) the dividend yield on the
S&P Composite Index (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1988, Ferson and Harvey, 1999); (2) the
one-month T-bill rate (see, e.g., Shanken, 1990); (3) the growth rate of industrial production,
computed as the ¯rst di®erence in the logarithm of the monthly seasonally adjusted index
of industrial production provided by the Federal Reserve Board (see, e.g., Campbell and
Mei, 1993); (4) the term spread de¯ned as the end-of-month di®erence between the yield
15on Aaa corporate bonds and the annualized one-month T-bill rate (see, e.g., Fama and
French, 1989, Ferson and Harvey, 1999); (5) the default spread, de¯ned as the end-of-month
di®erence between the yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds (see, e.g., Fama and French,
1989, Ferson and Harvey, 1999).
Panel B of Table ?? provides summary statistics for the state variables. Figures 5 and 6
graph them, along with NBER business cycle dates.
Fama and French (1989) give a thorough discussion of the cyclical behavior of the state
variables. Here I summarize the main points. The default spread, although showing some
negative correlation with the business cycle, displays major swings that go beyond the eco-
nomic cycle (Figure 5). The spread is high during the thirties and the early years of World
War II, a period characterized by major economic uncertainty. In the rest of the sample it is
lower except for some blips in the periods of recession during the seventies and early eight-
ies. A similar behavior characterizes the dividend yield (Figure 5), which is highly correlated
with the default spread. What is peculiar about the dividend yield is the drop that occurred
during the bull market of the second half of the nineties. The T-bill rate gravitates around
zero in the 1933-1951 period that covers much of the Great Depression and the period after
World War II, when the Fed ¯xed T-bill rates. Outside that interval the T-bill rate comes
close to de¯ning the business peaks and troughs identi¯ed by the NBER (Figure 6). Since
the Aaa yield does not track the business cycle as closely as the T-bill rate, the term spread,
except for the 1933-1951 period, follows more closely the business cycle (Figure 6) 8. It is
low at peaks, predicting recessions, and high at troughs, predicting recoveries. Finally, the
growth rate of industrial production is strongly mean-reverting, so that high growth rates
are soon followed by negative growth.
The estimation of the regression in Equation (7) for B/M and size portfolios produces
estimates of b0 and b1 that can be replaced in Equation (8) along with the series of the state
8The T-bill series and the term series in Figure 6 appear to have di®erent volatility. This is a result of
using di®erent scales for the two series. In reality they move together, being the term spread mainly driven
by the T-bill rate component.
16variables to ¯t the path of these stocks' beta. Figure 7 graphs the ¯tted beta for value stocks,
along with the series resulting from the rolling regressions estimation. The ¯tted series in
the graph has been constructed using two sets of estimates of b0 and b1 coming from the
1926-1962 and the 1963-2000 subsamples. The series of the estimated beta is aligned with
the end date of the ¯ve-year estimation window. The tracking ability of the ¯tted beta (solid
line) is striking. The estimated beta series appears smoother than the ¯tted series, because
the e®ect of one month of data is not relevant over a ¯ve-year estimation horizon. However,
the ¯tted beta follows closely all the main swings in the estimated beta. The correlation
coe±cient between the estimated and the ¯tted series is 0.84. The reader may be concerned
that this high level of correlation is a®ected by a `spurious regression' type of problem. To
tackle this concern, I perform a test of unit root on the di®erence between the two series.
In other words, I test whether the estimated and ¯tted beta are cointegrated with a (1 -1)
cointegration vector. If the high correlation is spurious, the test should detect a unit root in
the di®erence. In fact the correlation is authentic, as a Dickey-Fuller test on the di®erence in
the two series produces a test statistic of -7.2, which rejects the null hypothesis of unit root
at the 1% con¯dence level 9. The picture is very similar if b0 and b1 are estimated over the
whole 1926-2000 sample. The correlation is 0.78, and again the two series are cointegrated
at the 1% con¯dence level.
Figure 8 plots the estimated and ¯tted beta series for small stocks. Although the ¯tted
series does not track so closely the estimated one as in the case of value stocks, still it
captures the major drop in the beta that occurred in the twenty years between the 1940 and
1960. The correlation coe±cient is in this case 0.63, suggesting that perhaps some relevant
state variable has been left out from the information set.
Table ?? reports the coe±cients from the estimation of Equation (7) in the case of B/M
portfolios. Looking at the column for the tenth decile, we notice that in the whole 1926-2000
sample (Panel A) the risk free interest rate has the highest predictive ability: a one-standard
9Notice that the Dickey-Fuller test does not reject the null hypothesis that the estimated beta series has
a unit root
17deviation increase (0.25%) in the monthly T-bill rate would cause a decrease of about 0.25
in the conditional beta. This coe±cient decreases in absolute value as we move towards
lower B/M deciles, consistent with the theoretical constraint that the weighted sum of the b1
coe±cients is zero (while the weighted sum of the b0 coe±cients is one). The default spread
and the dividend yield have a similar predictive power for the conditional beta of value
stocks: an increase in both variables causes the conditional beta to go up. For example,
an increase of one percentage point in the annualized default spread causes the beta of the
tenth decile portfolio to rise by 0.1. In the whole sample the term spread is generally not
signi¯cant, while the growth rate of industrial production is signi¯cantly positively related
to conditional betas only for the higher deciles.
The analysis by subsamples (Panels B and C of Table ??) helps to further clarify the
e®ect of each conditioning variable. As far as the tenth B/M decile portfolio is concerned,
the default spread and the dividend yield take turns in explaining the conditional beta. The
¯rst variable is signi¯cant only between 1926 and 1962, while the second one is signi¯cant
only between 1963 and 2000. The T-bill rate is always negative and signi¯cant, although
more so in the ¯rst subsample. The term spread is signi¯cant with a negative coe±cient in
both subsamples. The impact of the growth rate of industrial production on the conditional
beta changes from positive to negative. In general, as we move towards lower B/M deciles
the predictive power of the state variables drops, suggesting that it is correct to focus the
attention on the changes that a®ected value stocks.
The regression results for small stocks (¯rst size portfolio in Table ??) are similar to the
case of value stocks. However, the predictive power of the state variables tends to drop in
the second subsample. This fact is in line with the reduced tracking ability of the ¯tted
series in Figure 8. Nevertheless, the major drop in small stocks' beta occurs before 1960,
and that is mostly captured by the state variables.
Finally, other state variables turn out to be signi¯cant predictors of beta for both B/M
and size portfolios. They have not been used for the plots in Figures 7 and 8, because their
inclusion would have increased the high frequency volatility of the ¯tted series, and decreased
18its ability to track the smooth estimated series. The most important of these variables are
the lagged excess market return and the volatility of the T-bill rate, constructed like in
Shanken (1990). A positive market return predicts an increase in the beta of value and small
stocks, whereas the e®ect of interest rate volatility is positive in the ¯rst subsample and
negative in the second one. The purpose of my analysis was tracking the long run trend in
the estimated beta series, but if the goal is predicting the future evolution of beta, then one
may want to include these instruments, which capture the high frequency movements in the
series of interest.
3.3 Discussion
As mentioned above, the connection between variables that summarize the state of the
macroeconomy and the beta of value and small stocks can be drawn because these companies
are more likely to be in a situation of relative distress. The likelihood with which they
actually are in distress can reasonably depend on the general state of the economy. Hence,
their riskiness, as summarized by the market beta, can vary as a function of the business
cycle and the general economic conditions.
In more detail, one can think of a model where distressed ¯rms approach default, or move
away from it, depending on the evolution of economic conditions. When a company is closer
to the earnings cuto® point below which it defaults, the ¯rm's payo® distribution can become
more volatile, and so can its stock returns. Then, this model can yield the prediction that
the beta of distressed ¯rms decreases when economic conditions improve, and vice versa.
The relationship between the macro variables and the beta of value and small stocks,
that was found in the previous subsection, seems to be in line with this model. Notice
that the improvement in business conditions that I refer to, can take place both along the
business cycle, and over the long run. In the ¯rst case the model describes the high frequency
variation in beta. In the second case, the result is the long-term decrease in beta that is the
main focus of the paper.
Fama and French (1989) interpret the power of the dividend yield and the default spread
19to predict increases in the expected return of stocks and bonds as related to the long-term
evolution of business risk. These two variables track some components of expected returns
that are high during periods like the Great Depression when business is persistently poor,
and low otherwise. Consistent with their interpretation, I ¯nd that the measure of riskiness
of some companies that are a priori believed to be more exposed to changes in business
conditions, their beta, follows closely the evolution of these two variables. In particular, the
decrease in the default spread and the dividend yield that occurred after the war explains a
large part of the decline in beta in that period. Similarly, the drop in the dividend yield in
the late nineties is responsible for the plunge in beta over those years.
The term spread tracks more closely the business cycle. It is low at the top of the
expansion, and high at the end of a recession. I ¯nd that an increase in the lagged term
premium predicts a decrease in the beta of value and small stocks. This result is in line
with the above interpretation, because a high term premium predicts a recovery from a
recession, from which distressed ¯rms should bene¯t. The signi¯cance of the term spread in
the subsamples, and not in the whole period, suggests that this variable captures the high
frequency variation of beta, rather than the long run trend.
The interest rate is highly pro-cyclical. However, like the default spread and the dividend
yield, it also tracks the long-term changes in business conditions that occurred starting from
the early ¯fties. Therefore, its relevance as a predictor of beta is due to both its long-term
swings and its cyclical movements. This fact is con¯rmed by the signi¯cance of the T-bill
rate in whole sample and in the subsamples.
The reason behind the predictive power of the growth rate of industrial production is
more dubious since its coe±cient changes from positive to negative. The positive coe±cient,
that prevails when the estimation is performed on the whole sample, would suggest that
due to the strong mean reversion of growth, a positive growth rate predicts a worsening of
economic conditions in the future.
The interpretation of the relation of these macro variables to the decline in beta that is
proposed here is also consistent with the evidence from the beta decomposition in Section 2.3.
20The general improvement of macroeconomic conditions can have made these stocks, normally
prone to distress, less risky, and their volatility smaller relative to the volatility of the rest
of the market.
The above analysis suggests a relation between a conditional CAPM approach and the
Fama-French three-factor model. The explanation of the link between these macroeconomic
variables and the beta of value and small stocks involves changes in the sensitivity to the
overall discount factor. The e®ect of these changes shows up in the beta of these companies
because they are presumably more sensitive to business conditions. If this is the case, the
loading on the market factor seems to capture some of the risk sources, like distress risk, that
Fama and French (1993) use to justify the introduction of additional factors in the pricing
model. Consequently, a conditional CAPM can be more appropriate than a three-factor
model in pricing portfolios other than value and small stocks, for which the HML and SMB
factors are bound to perform well.
Notice that the argument in favor of a conditional pricing model is consistent with the
results in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). Similar to the evidence in my paper, they ¯nd
that the correlation value stocks' returns with fundamental factors increases when risk or
risk aversion is high. This situation in turn occurs when economic conditions are poor, as
signalled by their cay state variable.
Finally, it has to be acknowledged that the behavior of value stocks' beta in the second
half of the nineties lends itself to a di®erent interpretation from the one proposed so far.
The drop in beta that occurs in that period is entirely driven by the decline in the dividend
yield, which in turn depends on the surge of the price level during the bull market of the
nineties. If a speculative bubble was behind that price increase, then the explanation for
the decline in beta cannot hinge on the evolution of the stochastic discount factor. Hence,
one may want to invoke a style investing argument (Barberis and Shleifer, 2001). In such
a scenario, beta could have dropped because the returns of value and glamour stocks have
become delinked, as a result of °ows of funds moving from one style of investment to the
other. The investigation of this explanation is left for future research.
214 A decomposition of market betas
4.1 Theoretical framework
If the interpretation of the link found in Section 3 between beta and the conditioning vari-
ables is correct, the decrease in the beta of value and small stocks should be associated with a
reduction in the sensitivity of these companies' cash°ows to the factors that cause movements
in the market. The reason behind this prediction is that, according to the above interpre-
tation, an improvement in the distress condition of these companies makes their cash°ows
less volatile in response to shocks. I use Campbell and Mei's (1993) beta decomposition to
address this issue.
Campbell and Shiller's (1988) log-linearized present value relationship allows one to ex-
press unexpected excess returns, or excess return innovations, in terms of news about div-
idends, news about excess returns and news about real interest rates. Following Campbell
(1991), ei;t+1 is the (continuously compounded) excess return on portfolio i over the (con-
tinuously compounded) real return ri;t+1 on a one-month T-bill, and di;t+1 is the (log) real
dividend. Then, portfolio i's unexpected excess return ~ ei;t+1 can be expressed as















= ~ edi;t+1 ¡ ~ er;t+1 ¡ ~ eei;t+1: (9)
The notation (Et+1¡Et) indicates a revision in the conditional expectation between times
t and t + 1. The constant ½ comes from the linearization process, and can be interpreted as
a discount factor. The value of ½ is assumed to be the same for all portfolios 10. The second
equality in (9) introduces simpler notation for dividend news ~ edi;t+1, real interest rate news
~ er;t+1 and excess return news ~ eei;t+1.
10I refer to the Appendix in Campbell (1991) for the derivation of Equation (9) and to Campbell and
Shiller (1988) for a discussion of its approximation accuracy. It turns out that ½ = 1
1+ed¡p, where d ¡ p is
set to the average log dividend price ratio. Campbell and Mei (1993) argue that the assumption of a unique
value of ½ across all portfolios does not a®ect the results for plausible variations in ½.
22Equation (9) follows from an approximation of a present value identity after ruling out
explosive behavior of stock prices, and can be thought of as a consistency condition for
expectations. It simply states that, if unexpected returns are high today, then either there
has been an upward revision in the expectation of future dividends, or a downward revision
in the returns that the stock is expected to pay in the future, or both. The e®ect of future
real returns is similar to that of future excess returns.
The Appendix describes in detail how to obtain each component of the return innovations.
Brie°y, the expected return on each portfolio is assumed to be a linear function of a vector
of predetermined state variables, one of which is the real interest rate. The residuals in these
predictive regressions represent the return innovations. The state variables are assumed to
follow a VAR process. It is therefore possible to compute the revision in the expectation of
every future value of the state variables, and take the discounted sum of these terms, which,
combined with the parameters in the predictive regression, gives the expected return news
component of returns. The real interest news component is also obtained from the parameters
of the VAR. The cash°ow news component is obtained residually using Equation (9) and
the other two components.
As far as the cross-sectional aspects of the analysis are concerned, Campbell and Mei
(1993) de¯ne a portfolio beta using unconditional variances and covariances of portfolio
and market innovations. That is, beta is the unconditional covariance of the excess return
innovation ~ ei with the market innovation ~ em, divided by the unconditional variance of the
market innovation
¯i;m ´
Cov(~ ei; ~ em)
V ar(~ em)
: (10)
This beta is neither an unconditional beta (which would use returns themselves rather
than innovations) nor a conditional beta (which would use conditional moments). However,
it would coincide with a conditional beta if the conditional variance-covariance matrix of
innovations had constant elements, or at least elements that changed in proportion to one
another.
The de¯nition in (10) has the advantage that the portfolio beta can be expressed as the
23sum of the market betas of the three news components. From Equations (9) and (10), it
follows directly that
¯i;m =
Cov(~ edi; ~ em)
V ar(~ em)
¡
Cov(~ er; ~ em)
V ar(~ em)
¡
Cov(~ eei; ~ em)
V ar(~ em)
= ¯di;m ¡ ¯r;m ¡ ¯ei;m; (11)
where ¯di;m is the market beta of news about portfolio i's cash°ows, ¯r;m is the market beta
of news about future real interest rates, and ¯ei;m is the market beta of news about portfolio
i's future excess returns.
The assumption behind this analysis is that the vector of state variables represents en-
tirely investors' information set. If this was not the case, the estimated dividend component
of returns would contain a reaction to changes in expected returns, which would undermine
the interpretation of the results.
4.2 Empirical Implementation
The ¯rst step in implementing the beta decomposition developed in Section 4.1 is to esti-
mate the return components. To this purpose one needs to estimate the VAR system (19),
along with the predictive regressions in (18), and to replace the estimated parameters in the
expressions given in (21).
The VAR and the predictive regressions are estimated using OLS on each equation. In this
case, where all the equations have the same right-hand-side variables, the estimates coincide
with the ones obtained with a GMM procedure. Then, I combine the sample variances and
covariances of the estimated return components to obtain the betas.
The purpose of this analysis is to ¯nd out the source of the observed decrease in market
beta for value and small stock portfolios. Thus, I insert the beta decomposition methodology
into the rolling regression framework that I adopted to document the fact under considera-
tion. The use of annual data allows the state variables to have considerably higher predictive
power in both the VAR equations and the portfolio predictive regressions. This ¯nding is
consistent, for example, with the results in Fama (1990), who argues that the predictive
24variables contain information that pertains to several months of return data, creating an
error in variable problem that is attenuated in annual data.
However, the use of annual data reduces the number of available data points and this
creates a problem for the convergence of the estimated parameters. Therefore, I construct the
annual data from monthly data, so that two consecutive observations have a three quarter
overlap. Each annual observation spans the period up to the end of a quarter. Moreover,
I use twenty-¯ve-year estimation windows, so that each regression is estimated using one-
hundred overlapping annual data points. The estimation window advances by one data point
at a time, which means that one quarter of new data is added to the right of the sample,
and one quarter is lost on the left.
At this point a caveat is necessary. The Campbell and Mei (1993) procedure makes
an implicit stationarity assumption. The parameters of the VAR, as well as the variance-
covariance structure of the portfolio returns are assumed to be constant, not only throughout
the estimation period, but, as far as the VAR is concerned, over an in¯nite horizon. The
facts that beta changes over time, and that the estimated parameters of the VAR are not
constant, might cast some doubt on the validity of the analysis. However, the assumption of
a constant beta can be considered as a descriptive shortcut to look at the average beta over
the estimation window, as it was the case in Section 2, when the rolling window procedure
was ¯rst introduced. Moreover, the instability of the VAR should not considerably a®ect
the results as long as the VAR coe±cients vary at low frequencies, because in that case
discounting should reduce the importance of the terms of the present value formulas that
are distant in the future.
The returns of interest are the continuously compounded returns on B/M and size port-
folios, from July 1926 to December 2000. For the de¯nition of the vector of state variables I
follow the previous literature. As said before, the ¯rst two variables have to be the market
return and the real interest rate. Therefore I use the return on the CRSP value-weighted
index, and the continuously compounded return on the one-month T-bill, de°ated by the
change in the (log of the) CPI index. Campbell and Mei (1993) also include the aggregate
25dividend yield, the in°ation rate, and the growth rate of industrial production, de¯ned in
Section 3. I use the dividend yield on the S&P Composite Index, which turns out to have
slightly more predictive power than the one constructed from the NYSE universe. The in-
°ation rate is the change in the log of the CPI index. In addition to these variables I include
the term spread, which is de¯ned as in Section 3 (Table ?? provides summary statistics for
portfolio returns and the state variables). For this sample, consistent with previous studies,
a reasonable value for ½ is 0.96 in annual data and 0.9962 in monthly data.
I can provide some evidence on the increased predictive power allowed by the use of
annual data rather than monthly data. In my sample the average R2 over the ten predictive
regressions for B/M portfolios in the whole 1926-2000 period is only 1.7% with monthly data
(892 observations per regression). Instead it is considerably higher, 10.6%, with overlapping
annual data (291 observations per regression).
The evidence on the sources of the decrease in beta comes from both a split of the main
sample into two major subsamples, and a rolling regression analysis.
The analysis by subsamples is presented in Table 2 for B/M portfolios. Each beta esti-
mate and the corresponding standard error have been obtained from OLS regressions of the
appropriate return component on the market innovation.
In Panel A the estimation period coincides with the entire 1926-2000 sample. The plau-
sible values of market betas in the ¯rst row testify that using innovations to de¯ne betas, as
opposed to returns themselves, does not signi¯cantly a®ect the results. The betas of high
decile portfolios (value stocks) are in general higher than those of low B/M deciles. This
ranking di®ers from what reported in previous studies, such as Fama and French (1993), be-
cause my sample starts much earlier, in a time when value stocks used to have higher betas.
The ranking in the overall betas seems to be determined entirely by the market sensitivity
of the excess return news component ¯ie;m, which, especially for value stocks, is the most
sizeable part.
In Panel B the sample covers the 1926-1962 period. The spread in the betas of value
over the beta of glamour stocks is even more pronounced than the one in the overall sample.
26Again, the responsibility of the di®erence in the overall beta lies with the excess return betas,
rather than the cash°ow betas.
The results in Panel C (1963-2000 sample), where the ranking in the overall betas is
inverted with respect to Panels A and B, re°ect the empirical fact that has inspired this
paper. The beta of value stocks has decreased considerably over the years, while the opposite
happened for glamour stocks 11. From the comparison of Panels B and C it is clear that
the source of the decrease in the overall beta of value stocks is the decrease in ¯id;m, namely
the cash°ow beta. The rolling regression analysis will make it even more clear that the
reduction in cash°ow beta plays the dominant role. The beta of real interest rates, which
was not signi¯cant in Panels A and B, becomes negative and highly signi¯cant in Panel C.
In order to further de¯ne the source of the decreasing trend in the value stock beta, I now
turn to the rolling regression analysis. A ¯rst graphic impression of the results is provided
by Figure 9, that graphs the evolution of the estimated beta of the tenth decile, along with
its cash°ow component and the negative of its excess return component. It is evident from
the picture that the responsibility of the decreasing trend in the overall beta lies with the
cash°ow beta, which drops from 1.11 in the twenty-¯ve-year estimation window ending in
June 1961, to -0.65 in the window ending in December 1995. The excess return beta does
not seem to have any apparent trend. This impression is con¯rmed by the statistical tests
that follow.
To quantify the evolution of the di®erent beta components, I ¯t a trend line through each
of the beta series obtained from the rolling regressions. The results are reported in Table ??,
Panel A. As said above, I use overlapping annual data, and the estimation window advances
by one quarter per observation, so that the trend coe±cients measure the change in the beta
per quarter. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West estimator of variance which
corrects for the autocorrelation due to the use of overlapping windows in estimating beta.
Equation (11) implies that the trend in ¯id;m , minus the trend in ¯ie;m, minus the trend in
11For market betas of innovations, as for normal betas, it holds that the weighted average of the population
betas of the di®erent partitions of the market (e.g., B/M or size portfolios) is equal to one.
27¯r;m (-0.001), equals the trend in the overall market ¯i;m. The trend line is negatively sloped
for the highest B/M deciles, and the slope gradually becomes positive as we approach the
portfolios of glamour stocks.
Table ?? provides detailed evidence on the sources of the decrease in the overall betas.
The cash°ow betas of all portfolios trend down, and this e®ect is stronger for values stocks 12.
However, in the case of glamour stocks this trend does not a®ect the overall betas, given
that the negative estimates of ¯ie;m become progressively bigger in absolute value. Instead,
in the case of value stocks the negative trend in the cash°ow beta is much stronger (-0.007
per quarter for decile ten), and it is not counterbalanced by a decrease in the excess return
beta. Hence, I can conclude that the decrease in cash°ow beta is the source of the observed
decrease in the overall beta.
The fact that the results presented in this section hinge on the cash°ow news component,
which is estimated residually, might raise some concerns, which would be justi¯ed in case
the VAR process was misspeci¯ed. To tackle this issue, I follow Campbell and Mei (1993)
and form a direct measure of cash°ow news by regressing annual log real dividend growth
on the state variables, and using the VAR process for the state variables to form revisions in
expectations of future dividends (details in the Appendix). Then, I can compute the cash°ow
beta series in the usual way, and ¯t a trend line through the series of estimates. The results,
not reported, con¯rm the picture presented above. If anything, the decreasing trend in the
cash°ow beta for the value stock portfolio is stronger (-0.012, with t-stat. = -3.36). Hence,
the use of residual cash°ow news does not seem to a®ect the signi¯cance of the evidence
presented in this section.
The picture for size portfolios largely resembles that for B/M portfolios, and small stocks
play the role of value stocks. Over the entire sample the major drop in the overall beta is
again imputable to a drop in the cash°ow beta. However, after the beginning of the eighties
the high frequency movements in the overall beta depend on the decrease in the excess return
12Notice that the beta components do not have to satisfy the constraint of adding to one across portfolios.
Therefore it is possible that the cash°ow betas of all portfolios decrease over time.
28beta.
Table 3 con¯rms the decline in the beta of small stocks and the corresponding increase
in the beta of large stocks. The market beta of the ¯rst decile portfolio, for example, is 1.60
between 1926 and 1962, and it drops to 1.36 in the 1963-2000 subsample.
The big drop in ¯ie;m that appears from the table, is not indicative of the global source of
decrease in the overall beta, because it is a®ected by the last years of data. In fact Figure 10
shows that ¯ie becomes very small in absolute value only around the end of the sample.
Instead, the graph indicates that over the entire 1926-2000 period the drop in the cash°ow
beta is the main source of the decline in the market sensitivity of small stocks. Moreover, it
is also evident from Figure 10 that after the beginning of the eighties the overall beta follows
the path of ¯ie;m, which declines in absolute value.
The analysis of the linear trends in the estimates from the rolling regressions procedure
con¯rms that the source of the drop in the overall beta of small stocks is the decrease in
the cash°ow beta. Panel B of Table ?? shows that the overall beta of decile one portfolio,
for example, has a linear trend of -0.005, which is entirely imputable to the -0.008 trend in
¯id;m. Notice, however, that if the trend is computed using only the betas whose estimation
window ends after January 1980, then the -0.004 (t-stat. = -10.96) trend in the overall beta
depends on the decrease in the absolute value of the excess return beta (trend in ¯ie;m equal
to 0.010, with t-stat. = 8.64). The use of direct, rather than residual, cash°ow news, in the
way described above, con¯rms entirely the results presented so far.
So, as in the case of value portfolios, the evidence suggests that the observed instability
in the overall market betas of small stocks can be imputed to changes in the sensitivity of
cash°ow news to market returns.
Overall, the evidence from the beta decomposition is consistent with the conclusions
from Section 3, which used conditional information to track the evolution of beta. That
analysis suggested that the decrease in the beta occurred because the general improvement
in the economic conditions has made the activities of these companies less risky. This section
showed that, indeed, the decrease in the beta is imputable to the fact that the cash°ows of
29these ¯rms are less sensitive to market news.
5 Relation to mispricing
The previous sections have established that the beta of value and small stocks has experienced
a major decline over the past sixty years. A question that arises naturally is how this fact
relates to the debate surrounding the failure of the CAPM to price correctly these categories
of stocks.
Figure 11 plots the beta and the intercept (i.e. the alpha) from time-series CAPM re-
gressions for value stocks 13. A one-tailed t-tests rejects the hypothesis that the intercept is
equal to zero at 5% level in most of the estimation windows from the early seventies to the
mid-nineties. It is evident from the picture that the occurrence of mispricing starting from
the seventies goes side by side with the decrease in beta. Alpha started to rise in the early
sixties, when beta was experiencing a major drop, and its growth is always accompanied
by a decline in beta. The correlation between the two series is about -50%. The graph for
small stocks (not reported) also shows that alpha rises when beta declines, although for this
portfolio the mispricing disappears in the late eighties.
The decrease in beta can be related to mispricing in at least two ways. First, if the correct
pricing model is a conditional CAPM, and the estimated model is an unconditional CAPM,
the premium estimated by the econometrician contains a bias due to correlated omitted
variables. Secondly, the drastic changes in beta can have caused investors to formulate the
wrong expectations on the riskiness of these stocks. The next subsections examine these two
explanations.
13The series are produced using rolling regressions with a ten-year estimation window. I extended the
estimation window from ¯ve to ten years to obtain smoother series, and to have more power in the t-tests
on the intercept.
305.1 The omitted variable bias
The time-series tests of the CAPM, like the ones in Fama and French (1993), which rely
on the signi¯cance of the intercept to decide if the market value-weighted portfolio is on
the mean-variance e±cient frontier, fail to incorporate the time variation in beta. So, for
example, Fama and French (1993, Table 9a) ¯nd that the portfolio of small high B/M stocks
has a monthly premium of 0.54% (t-stat. = 2.53) in the 1963-1991 sample.
However, even if the CAPM holds conditionally, it does not necessarily hold uncondi-
tionally. For it to be the case the relevant moments of the joint conditional distribution of
returns would have to be constant over time, or change proportionally. The evidence of a
decreasing beta does not depose in favor of this possibility. In fact, the analysis of Section 3
showed that beta can be closely tracked by a number of state variables summarizing the
state of the economy. Hence, there are reasons to believe that part of the premium found
for these categories of stocks in the time-series tests can be explained by time variation in
beta, in the form of a correlated omitted variable bias.
Suppose one estimates the following unconditional CAPM regression
Ri;t+1 = ®i + ¯iRm;t+1 + ui;t+1; (12)
but the correct model is a conditional CAPM
EtRi;t+1 = ¯i;tEtRm;t+1; (13)
where the conditional beta is a linear function of some state variables, as in Equation (6).
Then, solely because of the omission of the time variation in beta from the unconditional
regression, the estimated intercept turns out to be di®erent from zero. In particular, the
probability limit of b ®i is
Plim b ®i = b
0
1;i(Ee z ¡ °ERm); (14)
where e z = ztRm;t+1, and ° is the linear projection coe±cient of e zt on the market return
Rm;t+1. So, when beta is a non-trivial function of the state variables, and the term in
31parenthesis is also not zero 14, part of the premium in the time-series unconditional CAPM
regressions can be explained on the basis of Equation (14).
From Panel C of Tables ?? and ?? it appears that the tenth B/M portfolio and the ¯rst
size portfolios are those that in the 1963-2000 subsample have the highest absolute values of
the coe±cients in the vector b1;i. This fact makes it more likely for the estimated intercept
from an unconditional CAPM regression to be di®erent from zero, as it can be seen from
Equation (14).
In order to assess what part of the premium of value and small stocks is accounted for
by the omission of the time variation in beta, one can compute the sample equivalent of
the expression in Equation (14) and compare it with the intercept from the regression in
Equation (12). An equivalent, and more simple, way to do that is estimating Equation (7),
and comparing the intercept from that regression with the intercept from the unconditional
regression in Equation (12). In the case of value stocks, about 30% of the 0.44% monthly
premium in the 1963-2000 sample can be accounted for when beta is allowed to vary. For
small stocks this share is 66%, but the premium in the 1963-2000 sample is just 0.10%, and
it is not signi¯cant. In shorter samples, like the 1963-1980 one, this procedure does not seem
to account for any sizeable part of the premium to small stocks.
Besides shedding some light on the sources of the value premium, the results from this
analysis suggest that the conditional version of the CAPM should be preferred to the un-
conditional one in most applications. The time variation in portfolio betas and the ability
to track it with state variables, which have been documented in this paper, make the sta-
tionarity assumption behind the unconditional CAPM not realistic.
5.2 Exaggerated perception of risk
Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that characteristics, as opposed to covariation with risk
factors, generate the observed premium of small and value stocks. In their view, the market
14Notice that the term in parentheses in Equation (14) is trivially zero if the state variables are constant
over time. It is also zero if the market return is independent of the state variables.
32dislikes these categories of stocks, so that a premium is required for investors to hold them.
This negative attitude towards small and value stocks might depend on the fact that investors
overestimated their systematic risk. As more powerful computing resources become publicly
available, these anomalies should disappear. The size e®ect actually disappeared in the early
80's, as well as the B/M e®ect in the late nineties.
Consistent with this argument, I argue that the large decline that the beta of value and
small stocks experienced starting from the early forties can be the reason why investors
made mistakes in the assessment of risk. The observation that these assets used to bear a
great deal of market risk in the years of the Great Depression and World War II can have
convinced investors that the value and small characteristics were associated with higher risk.
Consequently, these stocks had to pay a premium, even when the amount of systematic risk
they were bearing had declined.
Suppose the return that the market expects in the next period for the portfolios of interest






i is the expectation of beta. This assumption implies that the probability limit of
the estimated intercept in a time-series unconditional CAPM regression is
®i = (¯
e
i ¡ ¯i)ERm;t+1: (16)
To keep things simple, suppose for now that the expectation of beta is identically equal
to the value of beta estimated from all past return realizations. More complicated setups in
which the market learns from the path of realized betas will be discussed later.
From Equation (16) it is evident that whenever the expectation of beta exceeds the true
beta, the portfolio pays a premium relative to the CAPM, and the estimate of alpha from
the time-series regression tends to a positive value. Hence, in the case of value and small
stocks, the decreasing path of estimated betas and the assumption of adaptive expectations
can actually explain part of the premium.
33To implement the model empirically, I split the sample of realized returns in two sub-
samples, from 1926 to 1962 and from 1963 to 2000. The second subsample more or less
coincides with the time period when the CAPM was known to ¯nancial markets. Further, I
assume that the market expected return for the portfolio of interest in the second subsample
is formed according to Equation (15), and the expectation of beta is equal to the estimate
of beta from the ¯rst subsample. Finally, I assume that these expectations are not revised
until the end of the second subsample. Although these assumptions are obviously unrealistic,
they capture the idea that the high level of market risk born by value and small stocks in
the years of the Great Depression and World War II a®ected the market expectations of how
risky these stocks would be later on.
By replacing sample estimates in Equation (16), I can compute the fraction of the esti-
mated intercept in the CAPM regression in the 1963-2000 subsample that is explained by
the model above. For value stocks the intercept is 0.44% (t-stat. = 2.9) between January
1963 and December 2000, while beta is 1.64 in the ¯rst subsample, and 0.97 in the second
subsample. The product of the di®erence in these betas and the mean excess market return
between 1963 and 2000 (0.52% monthly) is equal to 0.35%, which is the sample equivalent
of the expression in Equation (16). Hence, under these assumptions, the misperception of
the riskiness of value stocks can have caused about 80% of the premium that they paid in
the 1963-2000 subsample.
Small stocks did not have much of a premium in the whole 1963-2000 subsample (only
0.10%). Therefore, the above method would imply an intercept that is almost three times
as big as the actual intercept. Instead, when I restrict the second subsample to end in 1980,
which was approximately when the size e®ect disappeared, the estimated premium is 0.59%
(t-stat. = 2.1). Beta in the 1926-1962 subsample is 1.65, and in the 1963-1980 subsample
is 1.29, while in the same period the mean monthly market excess return is 0.34%. Hence,
misperception of risk, as de¯ned above, generates a 0.12% monthly premium, which is about
20% of the realized premium for small stocks.
More complicated setups than the one described above can be thought, where the market
34revises its adaptive expectations on the basis of realized returns. Suppose, for example, that
investors form their expectations of beta by combining the corresponding expectation in the
previous period and the last estimate of beta, as in the following equation
¯
e





t is the beta expected to apply to time t+1, b ¯t is the estimated beta at time t, and
± is a weighting coe±cient.
To make this model operational, I insert it in a ten-year rolling regression framework,
starting from 1963. So, b ¯t corresponds to the estimate of beta in the last ten-year window.
In some estimation windows the mean value of the market excess return is negative and I
cannot use it as an estimate of the market premium, because it would be inconsistent with
CAPM. Hence, I estimate EtRm;t+1 using the mean excess market return from the beginning
of month t+1 to December 2000. The estimates obtained with this procedure are consistently
positive. So, for each window I can compute an estimate of the ® in Equation (16) using the
expectation of beta from Equation (17), the estimate of beta in the window, and the estimate
of the market excess return. I calibrate ± to minimize the sum of the squared di®erences
between the estimates of ® and the estimated intercepts in the CAPM rolling-regressions.
Finally, I set the initial condition for ¯
e
t to equal the estimate of beta in the 1926-1962
subsample.
When this model is applied to the value portfolio, the optimal ± is around 0.002. This
small number is consistent with the idea that one additional month of data is not very
informative about beta. The distribution of the share of the premia in the CAPM rolling
regressions explained by the estimates of ® has mean equal to 104%, median equal to 70%,
maximum equal to 487%, minimum equal to 32%, and standard deviation equal to 94%.
Again in the case of small stocks I restrict the sample to the years up to 1980. Further,
I consider only the estimation windows for which the intercept in the CAPM regressions is
positive, namely the ones in which there is actually a premium. The optimal value of ± is
then 0.06. For these windows, the distribution of the share of the premia that is explained
by the estimate of ® has mean equal to 75%, median equal to 66%, maximum equal to 331%,
35minimum equal to 22%, and standard deviation equal to 54%.
Notice that these exercises do not account for the e®ect on returns of the revision in
the expectation of future discount rates. Investors' realization that beta is lower than they
thought causes a positive surprise in returns, because future payo®s are discounted at a
lower rate. To the extent that these surprises are correlated across periods, this e®ect shows
up as a positive premium in the CAPM regression. Therefore, the distributions of premia
that were computed above represent a lower bound on the premia that can be generated
under the assumption that investors slowly learn about beta. A non-arbitrary assessment
of the impact of the revision in discount rates on the premium can be provided within an
equilibrium model of learning on beta, which is developed in Adrian and Franzoni (2002).
Although the assumptions underlying the above models are certainly restrictive, the
results presented in this subsection suggest that misperception of risk based on the higher
values of beta characterizing value and small stocks in the early years of the sample can play
a big role in explaining the premia of these portfolios. This hypothesis is pursued in further
research (Adrian and Franzoni, 2002), which develops a formal models of learning on beta,
and assesses the relevance of the decrease in beta for the estimated premium of value and
small stocks.
6 Conclusions
This paper found a striking decrease in the market beta for portfolios of value and small
stocks. In the course of sixty years the beta of each of these portfolios decreased by about
75%. The maximum estimated beta for value stocks was 2.2 in the early forties, and the
minimum was 0.55 in the late nineties. The situation for small stocks evolved similarly.
The fact that the path of beta can be closely tracked using state variables that are related
to business conditions, such as the nominal interest rate, the default spread, the term spread,
the dividend yield, and the growth rate of industrial production, suggested the interpretation
that a change occurred in the structure of these companies' cash°ows. According to this
36argument, the improvement of business conditions reduced payo® uncertainty for all ¯rms,
and especially for value and small companies, which are believed to be more prone to distress,
and therefore more sensitive to the status of the economy. Support for this intuition came
from the result that the source of the decrease in the beta is the decline in the sensitivity of
cash°ow news to market news. This interpretation generates the out-of-sample prediction
that we should observe a rise in the beta of these portfolios in conjunction we the recent
economic downturn and the interest rate cuts.
This evidence is relevant for the debate on the premium to value and small stocks in
the CAPM regressions. The amount of market risk born by these stocks went down con-
temporaneously to the appearance of the premium. The paper found some evidence that a
part of the premium, which can be as high as 80% for value stocks, originates from investor
beliefs that a high level of market risk would characterize these stocks even when, due to the
decrease in beta, this was no longer the case. This argument is in line with some behavioral
explanations of the anomaly (e.g., Daniel and Titman, 1997) that suggest that the market
may have misperceived the riskiness of these portfolios.
Finally, the paper provided further evidence in favor of the adoption of a conditional
version of the CAPM in place of the unconditional one. The sizeable changes in the beta
of these portfolios, the close relationship between these changes and the evolution of some
state variable, the ability to explain 30% of the value premium once the time variation of
beta is taken into account, are all elements that motivate a model that lets beta depend on
some conditioning information.
These ¯ndings can have applications in the areas of portfolio selection and performance
evaluation. Mutual funds that adopt value or small cap strategies should know that the
amount of market risk born by their portfolios is subject to variation over time. For example,
the fund manager should expect value and small stock portfolios to become more risky
during recessions. The good news is that this evolution can be predicted on the basis of
information that is easily available, and using a simple linear relationship. Also, when
evaluating performance of mutual fund managers, one needs to take into account the fact
37that the manager can predict changes in the portfolio beta, especially for these categories
of stocks. Hence, the manager should not be rewarded for portfolio returns that can be
anticipated using conditioning information. Ferson and Schadt (1996) develop this idea by
assessing what part of mutual fund performance is imputable to changes in beta that were
predictable using a conditional CAPM.
Further research should extend di®erent aspects of this paper. The interpretation of the
link between beta and the state variables was not tested directly, and it was not supported
by some economic model. Possibly, one should look into the evolution of the accounting
and ¯nancial ¯gures of the companies in the portfolios of interest, and assess whether they
conform with the change-in-distress interpretation that was provided in the paper. Prelim-
inary evidence suggests that a measure of distress, such as the ratio of interest expenses to
operating income, is not only higher in the case of value and small companies, but it is also
more positively related to recessions. Moreover, the gap between the level of this ratio for
the companies of interest and for the rest of the market has been shrinking, consistent with
the negative trend in the beta.
Another promising direction of research concerns the implications of the decrease in beta
for the misperception of the riskiness of these stocks, and the premium that they pay. More
sophisticated models of learning on beta than the ones used in the paper can be developed
to ¯t these data. In order to feature a slow learning process, necessary to generate the
premium, these models can either assume that investors learn about the default risk of these
stocks from infrequent events like recessions, or they can be founded on some psychological
bias in probability assessment and expectation formation.
38A Obtaining the news components of returns
This Appendix describes how the di®erent components of excess return innovations in Equa-
tion (9) are obtained. In this I follow, with some minor modi¯cations, Campbell and Mei
(1993), who assume that expectations of portfolio excess returns are linear in a vector xt of
state variables xt;l, l = 1;:::;L, which represent investor information set. The ¯rst element
of this vector is the excess return on the market, and the second one is the real return on a
one-month T-bill, while the other elements are variables known at the end of period t. Thus,
the excess return on portfolio i can be written as
ei;t+1 = a
0
ixt + ~ ei;t+1 (18)
for some portfolio speci¯c L-element column vector of coe±cients. The expected return on
the portfolio is thus a0
ixt, while the unexpected return is ~ ei;t+1 = ei;t+1 ¡ a0
ixt.
Next it is assumed that the state vector follows a ¯rst-order VAR process
xt+1 = ¦xt + ~ xt+1; (19)
where the ~ xt+1 denotes the innovation in the state variables. The assumption of a ¯rst-order
VAR is not restrictive since a higher-order VAR can always be rewritten in ¯rst-order form
(see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1988). The L £ L matrix ¦ is known as the companion
matrix of the VAR. Given the VAR model, revisions in long-horizon expectations of xt+1 are
(Et+1 ¡ Et)xt+1+j = ¦
j~ xt+1: (20)
Further, I de¯ne the L-elements vectors ¶1 and ¶2 to have a one in ¯rst and second position,
respectively, and zeros in all other positions. These vectors pick the excess return on the
market and the real interest rate out of the VAR. Thus, Equation (20) and the de¯nitions
of ~ edi;t+1 and ~ eei;t+1 in (9) imply that the components of portfolio i return and of the market
39return can be written as follows
























The discounted sum of the revisions in expectations for the vector of state variables at
t + 1 is (I ¡ ½¦)¡1~ xt+1, where I is the L £ L identity matrix. This term is translated into
revisions of forecast portfolio returns through the vector ai, which links the state variables to
expected returns. Finally, the revision in expected cash°ows is determined residually from
Equation (9).
The cash°ow news component can also be computed directly under the assumption that
the state variables predict dividends as well. In particular, if c is the vector of regression
coe±cients of dividend growth on the state variables, and ¹t+1 are the residuals from this
regression, the direct cash°ow news is
e eid;t+1 = ¹t+1 + ½c
0(I ¡ ½¦)
¡1e xt+1: (22)
40Panel B: State Variables
Mean Std. Dev. ½1 ½2 ½3 ½4 ½12 ½24
T-bill .31 .25 .97 .95 .94 .93 .87 .78
Div. Yield .042 .015 .98 .96 .93 .91 .73 .56
Growth I.P. .003 .019 .53 .24 .08 -.02 -.15 -.11
Term spr. 2.11 1.36 .84 .77 .74 .69 .47 .21
Default spr. 1.13 .73 .97 .94 .91 .90 .75 .55
Panel C: Correlation matrix of State Variables
T-bill Term Def. DY Gr. I.P.
T-bill 1
Term -0.39 1
Def. -0.07 0.41 1
DY -0.29 0.09 0.56 1























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Table 2: Beta decomposition (B/M portfolios). Estimates from the following decom-
position of beta for B/M decile portfolios: ¯i;m = ¯di;m ¡ ¯r;m ¡ ¯ei;m. ¯i;m is
the portfolio beta computed using portfolio and market excess return innovations.
¯id;m is the dividend news component of beta. ¯ie;m is the expected return news
component of beta. ¯r;m is the real interest rate news component of beta. T-
statistics in parentheses.
Decile 1 4 7 10
Panel A: 1926-2000
¯i;m 1.04 1.06 1.10 1.29
(52.06) (55.72) (40.61) (27.93)
¯id;m 0.56 0.17 0.18 -0.10
(21.21) (4.36) (4.01) (-1.27)
¯ie;m -0.49 -0.89 -0.93 -1.39




¯i;m 0.95 1.14 1.20 1.44
(46.14) (51.50) (33.93) (22.65)
¯id;m 0.37 0.57 0.43 0.21
(8.00) (15.17) (7.59) (2.13)
¯ie;m -0.64 -0.63 -0.83 -1.28




¯i;m 1.15 0.98 0.89 0.85
(27.50) (27.35) (20.29) (14.38)
¯id;m 1.15 -0.80 -0.32 -0.92
(12.59) (-6.98) (-4.10) (-7.46)
¯ie;m 0.28 -1.50 -0.94 -1.49
(3.47) (-14.81) (-18.15) (-16.81)
¯r;m -0.28
(-16.68)
43Table 3: Beta decomposition (Size portfolios). Estimates from the following decom-
position of beta for Size decile portfolios: ¯i;m = ¯di;m ¡ ¯r;m ¡ ¯ei;m. ¯i;m is
the portfolio beta computed using portfolio and market excess return innovations.
¯id;m is the dividend news component of beta. ¯ie;m is the expected return news
component of beta. ¯r;m is the real interest rate news component of beta. T-
statistics in parentheses.
Decile 1 4 7 10
Panel A: 1926-2000
¯i;m 1.50 1.23 1.14 0.94
(29.05) (44.07) (64.74) (105.13)
¯id;m 0.26 0.14 0.23 0.40
(3.47) (2.59) (5.94) (18.47)
¯ie;m -1.25 -1.10 -0.92 -0.55




¯i;m 1.60 1.27 1.14 0.93
(23.69) (39.67) (54.18) (136.41)
¯id;m 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.45
(4.57) (6.96) (8.12) (13.69)
¯ie;m -1.18 -0.88 -0.80 -0.54




¯i;m 1.36 1.23 1.14 0.93
(15.09) (22.58) (34.31) (44.62)
¯id;m 0.39 -0.33 0.06 0.08
(3.48) (-2.89) (0.94) (2.69)
¯ie;m -0.69 -1.28 -0.80 -0.57
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